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Reappraising the Legality of Post-Trial Interviews 
Captain Fredric I. Lederer, Criminal Law Division, T JAGS A 
Enshrined by custom, the peculiar institu-
tion of the post-trial interview is coming under 
new attack. 1 Originally designed primarily as 





the convening authority subsequent to sen-
tencing by a general court-martial, the prac-
tice consists of an interview of the newly 
sentenced accused by either the staff judge 
advocate or, more usually, a member of the 
SJA's staff. At the interview information is 
sought regarding the accused's perception of 
his recent trial and sentence, whether the 
accused was satisfied with his trial defense 
counsel, and any information which might be 
helpful in the preparation of the post trial 
review and its sentencing recommendations. 2 
Despite its possible beneficial effects, the post-
trial interview closely approximates a mine-
field: with some luck the accused may make 
it to the other side alive and well-perhaps 
even in a slightly better tactical position. But 
with a misstatement the accused may hit a 
mine-reveal some past criminal act or nega-
tive attitude3-which may destroy him. 4 It is 
this very chance for disaster which has 
brought the post trial interview to the atten-
tion of the Court of Military Appeals. 
The origins of the post-trial interview are 
unclear. At one time it appears to have been 
supported, encouraged, and perhaps even re-
quired by both Air Force and Army policy. 11 
At present, however, there does not appear to 
be any statutory or regulatory requirement 
for post-trial interviews in the Army. Indeed 
some Army commands are known to have 
abandoned them completely. Perhaps as a 
result of this lack of a regulatory requirement, 
the procedure used to conduct post-trial inter-
views appear to vary by location. While the 
Air Force and some Army commands utilize 
privacy act statements, 8 including the state-
ment that the interview is voluntary, most 
commands do not warn the interviewee of his 
right to have counsel present or of his rights 
under Article 31 of the UCMJ. 7 At some posts, 
counsel may attend the interview but custom-
arily choose not to do so, 8 and in at least one 
case the refusal of an accused to make a 
statement at the post-trial interview was in-
cluded in the post-trial review.8 As a result, 
the key legal issues involved in an appraisal 
of the post-trial interview are the application 
DA Pam 27-50-55 
of the right against self-incrimination and the 
right to counsel at the post-trial interview. 
The application of the right against self-
incrimination at the post-trial interview is far 
from a simple matter, and there is a surpris-
ing lack of cases dealing with the point at 
which a convicted defendant loses his privi-
lege. However, what precedent does exist ap-
pears to support the proposition that a con-
victed defendant retains his privilege not only 
through sentencing but until completion of 
the appellate process. 10 In short, for self-in-
crimination purposes the "trial" continues un-
til finality attaches. This should be particu-
larly true for military proceedings because in 
the most fundamental sense, the actual trial 
of a court-martial is not complete until the 
convening authority has taken action on the 
trial court's "recommendations." u Further, 
Article 31(a)'s language 12 prohibits compul-
sory self-incrimination without reference to 
trial. The accused at a post-trial interview is 
in a position in which anything he says may 
supply material that would support not only 
the trial court's sentence but also its findings-
which remain to be approved. Thus, it appears 
clear that the accused retains his right 
against self-incrimination in the military at 
least 13 until the convening authority has act-
ed. Consequently the application of the Article 
31(b) warning requirements must be consid-
ered. The few cases dealing with the applica-
tion of Article 31(b) warnings to the post-trial 
interview unanimously hold it inapplicable 
although perhaps desirable. 111 The rationale 
used by the courts, however, is questionable 
at best, as the courts appear to be saying 
that an accused who is warned of his right to 
remain silent might choose to exercise it and 
thus frustrate the purpose of the interview.18 
This is akin to saying that the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination should 
be inapplicable to trials because it might 
interfere with the defendant's right to be 
convicted and rehabilitated. Dismissing then 
the few precedents in the area, one must 
reevaluate Article 31(b)'s application. By its 
very language, it would appear to apply to a 
post-trial interview, unless one can presume 
)--------------------------------~--~---------------------------------------------
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that the basic right against self-incrimination 
under Article 31 has already terminated, a 
conclusion rejected above. While the Court of 
Military Appeals has in the past held Article 
31(b)'s warning requirements inapplicable to 
the court-martial trial proceeding, 11 the rea-
soning involved, suspect in any event in the 
light of recent judicial developments, is distin-
guishable inasmuch as it emphasizes doubts 
as to the propriety of either defense counsel 
or trial counsel warning a witness of his 
rights and thereby frustrating. the presenta-
tion of evidence. 18 While the "post-trial" 
interview is in fact part of the trial of the 
accused, it is a distinct part of trial which 
lacks both the problems and protections af-
forded by the judicial phase which is carefully 
guided by a trial judge. While the Article 
31(d) exclusionary rule excludes evidence tak-
en in violation of either Article 31 or the 
voluntariness doctrine from •'trial by court-
martial," even if the exclusion is inapplicable 
to post-trial reviews (a doubtful conclusion) 
the remainder of Article 31 renders warnings 
mandatory! Just because a criminal act-in 
this case a breach of the warning require-
ments--may not suppress evidence does not 
render the act any less illegal. It has also 
been argued 18 that recent Supreme Court 
liecisions limiting prisoners' rights in the area 
of self-incrimination dispose of post-trial inter-
view complaints. However, even if constitu-
tional decision can be equated with interpre-
tation of the military's statutory privilege, that 
position ignores the fact that the m,ajor prece-
dents involved deals with convicted prisoners 
whose appeals have been concluded and who 
are subjected to an "administrative" proceed-
ing. The conclusion one reaches, then, is that 
Article 31(b) is fully applicable to the i>ost-trial 
interview, and that accused persons must be 
advised of their right to remain silent, and that 
anything said may be used against them at 
trial by court-martial. 
Current post-trial interview litigation em-
phasizes failure to warn the defendant of his 
right to counsel. Indeed, in one case, United 
States v. Simpson, 21 the Army Court of Mili-
tary Review, considering itself bound by 
United States v. Mc0mber,22 found ·that the 
failure to notify defense counsel of the forth-
coming interview to be error.23 In view of the 
unique nature of the court-martial proceeding, 
as discussed above, McOmber and any civilian 
cases dealing with the application of Miranda 
v. Arizona to post-trial matters are really 
irrelevant. The post-trial interview is taking 
place as a part of the court-martial proceed-
ing---the post-trial review. Consequently· the 
basic right to counsel under both Article 27 of 
the UCMJ 24 and the sixth amendment require 
that counsel be present or that the Supreme 
Court's standards for appearing pro se 25 be 
met. Even if "post-trial" proceedings are not 
a basic part of a court-martial, McOmber, by 
extending the statutory right to counsel to 
pre-trial proceedings,26 would surely extend it 
to such a "critical stage" as the post-trial 
interview. 
The post-trial interviewee would thus ap-
pear to be entitled to both the right to silence 
and the right to counsel and to be warned of 
those rights. 11:tis conclusion could well doom 
most post-trial interviews. But, why should 
they be continued in any event? Military law 
has changed drastically since post-trial inter-
view began. Defense cqunsel must now scruti-
nize the post-trial review, 27 and defense rep-
resentation must continue until conclusion of 
all proceedings without hiatus. 28 Surely de-
fense counsel not only can but ethically must 
bring forth any clemency information not 
within the record of trial, and counsel can 
always request a post-trial interview. Adverse 
material may well be eliminated in this fash-
ion, but shouldn't the convening authority's 
action be taken on the record of trial in any 
event? What then would be eliminated-only 
the questionable ability of a member of the 
SJA office to judge demeanor without the 
:need of visiting the court-room, and the possi-
bility of the accused raising a claim of inade-
quacy of counsel. Yet, civilian defendants de-
nied the comfort of a post-trial interview and 
seeking to challenge their attorney's represen-
tation do not appear hesitant to do so regard-
less of circumstances, and they do so without 
the added protections given by the Defense 
Appellate Division. 
In summary, the post-trial interview is of 
questionable legality within its current proce-
dural context, of little practical value to the 
accused, a waste of vitally needed legal re-
sources, and an unnecessary source of litiga-
tion. Staff judge advocates would do well to 
abolish it before the Court of Military Appeals 
does so. 
Notes 
1. See e.g. United States v. Lanzer, 3 M.J. 60 n. 6 
(C.M.A. 1977) in which Chief Judge Fletcher stated: "As 
should be evident from the body of this decision we 
have doubts as to the vitality of post-trial interviews, 
especially those in which the accused does not have 
benefit of counsel. Our disposition of this case makes it 
unnecessary to address this precise issue, and we will 
reserve judgment until the proper case.'' The court 
seems to have found the proper case in United States 
v. Kelly, ,>osition for review granted, 3 M.J. 87 (C.M.A. 
1977) in which the court agreed to determine whether a 
post-trial interview held in the absence of counsel and 
which yielded adverse material was a denial of due 
process. 
2. The day to day post-trial interview appears often to 
be merely a ritualistic gesture more likely to yield 
advance matter than important clemency material. It 
may however provide a helpful defense to trial defense 
counsel whose services are praised at the interview but 
attacked later. 
3. There are numerous cases in which the interview 
yielded damaging material. See e.g. United States v. 
Foer, SPCM 12265, appeal pending [at trial, Foer stated 
that he wanted to "stay in the service," while at the 
post-trial interview he stated that he did not want to 
return to duty.]; United States v. Albert, 31 C.M.R. 326 
(A.B.R. 1961) [accused confessed at the post-trial inter-
view to an unrelated larceny which was then comment-
ed upon in the post-trial review]. 
4. In one sense, of course, the post-trial action of the 
convening authority cannot hurt the accused because 
the convening authority cannot approve a sentence 
greater than that adjudged by the trial court. However 
this view is to ignore reality as sentences are frequently 
if not almost always modified by the convening author-
ity or by the Courts of Review. Thus, it can be presumed 
that there is usually a sentence which the accused 
would have received, lesser in degree than the one 
given by the court, but for consideration of adverse 
material given at the post-trial interview. 
15 
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5. See e.g. United States v. Clisson, 5 C.M.A. 277, 281, 17 
C.M.R. 277, 281 (1954) [referring to Air Force regulations 
requiring post-trial interviews]; United States v. Flem-
ing, 9 C.M.R. 602, 605-06 (A.B.R. 1953). 
6. The Air Force has promulgated ~& model privacy act 
statement for post-trial interviews and some Army 
commands are using privacy act statements. See e.g. 
Reply to the Assignment of Errors at 2, United States 
v. Foer, SPCM 12265, appeal pending [Fort Carson]. 
7. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1970). Many commands do in one 
respect or another tell the accused that participation in 
the post-trial interview is voluntary. Compliance with 
Article 31(b)'s warning requirements is virtually un-
known, however. 
8. cf. Reply to the Assignment of Errors at 2, United 
States v. Foer, supra note 6. 
9. Assignment of El'l'Or and Brief on Behalf of Appellant 
at 2, United States v. Minor, CM 434910, appeal pending. 
In view of the fact that neither counsel nor judge may 
comment on the silence of the accused at trial, affirma-
tive reference in the post-trial review to the fact that 
the accused remained silent on advice of counsel, as 
was the case in Minor, would seem highly questionable 
under both Article 31 and the fifth amendment. Certain-
ly it presents a classic dilemma to the accused who is 
afraid to participate for fear of revealing incriminating 
materials. 
10. See Goodrich, The Effect of a Guilty Plea on the 
Right Against Self-Incrimination and Its Effect on Re-
quested Testimony (Mar. 1977} (unpublished paper sub-
mitted in partial satisfaction of the diploma require-
ments of the 25th Advanced Class, The Judge Advocate 
General's School, U.S. Army) citing State v. Johnson, 77 
Idaho 1, 287 P.2d 425 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1007 
(1956) [privilege intact until completion of appeals since 
the pending appeal could result in a new trial]; People 
v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947) [appel-
late process prevented infringement of the -privilege 
until completion]; In re Bando, 20 F.R.D. 610 (D.C. N.Y. 
1957), rev'd on other grounds, United States v. Miranti, 
253 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1958), Annot., 9 A.L.R. 3d 1003 
(1966) [conviction had been affirmed but defendant was 
preparing to seek a writ of certiorari; held that mere 
preparation of a writ is insufficient to continue the 
privilege]. See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 121 (2d 
ed. 1972); cf. United States v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1231, 
1233 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1973) rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 
309 (1974). Contra, Knox v. State, 234 Md. 203, 198 A.2d 
285 (1964). 
It is interesting to note the recent decision of the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Rog-
ers, 21 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2195 (Pa. Apr. 28, 1977) in 
which the court held that even post appeal collateral 
relief may occasionally justify a defendant in exercising 
his privilege and refusing to testify at trial. The trial 
judge in such a case, said the court, must determine 
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whether the witness has "reasonable cause to appre-
hend danger of self-incrimination." In Rogers, the court 
was faced with the question of whether a defendant 
was improperly denied his right to full cross examina-
tion when the witness, a convicted co-participant in a 
robbery-murder, exercised his privilege to remain silent. 
11. The court-martial is not yet identical with civilian 
trials. Regardless of the merits of its present format 
and procedure, the court-martial is still a creature of 
command not yet fully divorced from its history. Despite 
the important consequences of completion of the court 
phase of a trial, both findings and sentence are virtually 
advisory recommendations (recommendations, whether 
as to findings or sentence, which can be completely 
ignored by the convening authority so long as his 
action is favorable to the accused) until acted upon by 
the convening authority. Historically, courts-martial 
were simply extensions of the commander, and even 
today for purposes of finality, the trial is merely an 
introduction to the commander's action. See e.g. United 
States v. Occhi, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 93, 96, 54 C.M.R. 
Adv. Sh. 93, 96 (1977) [Judge Cook stating that "The 
Court recently held .•. [that] the legal effect of a court-
martial depends upon the action of the convening 
authority rather than that of the trial court."]. But see 
Judge Perry dissenting in part, 64 C.M.R. Adv. Sh. at 99. 
12. 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (1970): "No person subject to this 
chapter may compel any person to incriminate himself 
or to answer any questions the answer to which may 
tend to incriminate him." 
13. Under the precedents and analysis discussed in 
note 10, supra, most general and some special· courts-
martial will not be final until after completion of the 
automatic appeal to the Court of Military Review and 
perhaps until the running of any time allowed for 
further appeal to the Court of Military Appeals. 
14. See United States v. Albert, 31 C.M.R. 326 (A.B.R. 
1961); United States v. Powell, 26 C.M.R. 521 (A.B.R. 
1958); United States v. Fleming, 9 C.M.R. 502 (A.B.R. 
1953). See also United States v. Simpson, SPCM 11744 
(A.C.M.R. 14 Apr. 1977). 
15. United States v. Powell, 26 C.M.R. 521, 526 (A.B.R. 
1958) [" ... we think that it would be preferable to give 
such a [Article 31] warning routinely if only to avoid 
any question of unfair treatment."] 
16. United States v. Fleming, 9 C.M.R. 502, 506 (A.B.R. 
1953). 
17. United States v. Howard, 5 C.M.A. 186, 17 C.M.R. 
186 (1954); but see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 
UNITED STATES, 1969 (Rev. ed.), ~ 140a(2), indicating 
that the trial judge may warn a witness of his rights if 
he begins to incriminate himself. 
18. The Court's reasoning in United States v. Howard, 5 
C.M.A. 186, 17 C.M.R. 186 (1964), was questionable when 
it was decided and is long overdue for reappraisal. One 
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would think that a prosecutor might have an ethical 
duty to warn a government witness of his rights. In 
any event a trial judge, no longer a "mere referee," can 
certainly be called upon to do s~ possibility apparent-
ly not considered by the 1954 Court. Further, if one is 
to be concerned with considerations of "efficiency" 
alone, the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL's discretion-
ary warning requirement, see note 17, supra, a quasi-
legislative judgement, would seem to destroy the issue. 
19. Reply to the Assignment of Errors at 3, United 
States v. Foer, SPCM 12265, appeal pending, citing 
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), a prison 
disciplinary proceeding. 
20. Respect for the principles behind Article 31 might 
transmute the warning to indicate 'that statements 
might be used against the accused in later proceedings 
of this trial as well as other proceedings. In United 
States v. Fleming, 9 C.M.R. 502, 507 (A.B.R. 1953), the 
court restricted later use of evidence given during a 
post-trial interview to proceedings involving the same 
offenses for which he had been sentenced. While Article 
31(b) normally requires that a suspect be warned of the 
offenses of which he is suspected, there is authority to 
dispense with that part of the warning when it is clear 
that the accused knows the nature of the accusation, 
United States v. Nitschke, 12 C.M.A. 489, 31 C.M.R. 75 
(1961), and surely the post-trial interviewee knows the 
nature of the offenses involved. 
21. See note 14, supra. 
22. 24 C.M.A. 207, 51 C.M.R. 452 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as McOmber]. In McOmber, the court held that a 
suspect or accused known to be represented by counsel 
cannot be interrogated pre-trial unless counsel is noti-
fied of the interrogation and given a reasonable oppor- · 
tunity to be present. 
23. However, the court found the error to be non-
prejudicial. 
24. 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970). It is important to note the 
emphasis that the Court of Military Appeals has placed 
on continuing representation of the accused "post-trial" 
and during the appellate process. United States v. 
Palenius, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 222, 229-31, 54 C.M.R. 
Adv. Sh. 649, 556-59 (1977). Counsel may have an ethical 
duty to attend post-trial interviews as well as a legal 
right to do so. 
25. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
26. The statutory basis of McOmber is questionable at 
best. Compare McOmber with United States v. Clark, 22 
C.M.A. 570, 48 C.M.R. 77 (1974). However, the case is 
now a major precedent and its reasoning would appear 
to apply at least in part to "post-trial" proceedings if 




and sentence are neither infrequent nor purely gratui-
tous in our system. In any event, United States v. 
Palenius, 26 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 222, 229-31, 64 C.M.R. 
Adv. Sh. 649, 666--59 (1977), requiring that there be no 
hiatus in representation, would appear determinative. 
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27. United States v. Goode, 23 C.M.A. 367, 60 C.M.R. 1 
(1976). 
28. United States v. Palenius, 25 C.M.A. Adv. Sh. 222, 
229-31, 64, C.M.R. Adv. Sh. 649, 656-59 (1977). 
